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Abstract
Emergent patterns in complex systems are related to many intriguing phenomena in modern science and
philosophy. Several conceptions such as weak, strong and robust emergence have been proposed to empha-
size different epistemological and ontological aspects of the problem. One of the most important concerns
is whether emergence is an intrinsic property of the reality we observe, or it is rather a consequence of epis-
temological limitations. To elucidate this question, we propose a novel approximation through constructive
topology, a framework that allow us to map the space of observed objects (ontology) with the knowledge
subject conceptual apparatus (epistemology). Focusing in a particular type of emergent processes, namely
those accessible through experiments and from which we have still no clue on the mechanistic processes
yielding its formation, we analyse how a knowledge subject would build a conceptual explanatory framework,
what we will call an arithmomorphic scheme. Working on these systems, we identify concept disjunction
as a critical logical operation needed to identify the system’s constraints. Next, focusing on a three-bits
synthetic system, we show how the number and scope of the constraints hinder the development of an arith-
momorphic scheme. Interestingly, we observe that our framework is unable to identify global constraints,
clearly linking the epistemological limits of the framework with an ontological feature of the system. This
allows us to propose a definition of emergence strength which we make compatible with the scientific method
through the active intervention of the observer on the system, following the spirit of Granger causality. We
think that this definition reconciles previous attempts to classify emergent processes, at least for the specific
kind we discuss here. The paper finishes discussing the relevance of global constraints in biological systems,
understood as a downward causal influence exerted by natural selection. In summary, we think that our
approach provides a meeting point for previous efforts on this topic, and we expect that it will stimulate
further research in both scientific and philosophical communities.
1 Introduction
“What urges you on and arouses your, you wisest of men, do you call it "will to truth"? Will
to the conceivability of all being: that is what I call your will! You first want to make all being
conceivable: for, with a healthy mistrust, you doubt whether it is in fact conceivable. But it must
bend and accommodate itself to you! Thus will your will have it. It must become smooth and subject
to the mind as the mind’s mirror and reflection.“
Friedrich Nietzsche [1]
Scientific modelling is probably one of the best examples of a human activity fitting the words of Zarathustra: it
requires the generation of conceptual representations for processes which depend, many times, on uncomfortable
features such as measurement inaccuracy, constituents interdependence or dynamics. We attempt to incorporate
these representations within a mathematical or computational framework, which is nothing but a comfortable
place where we reaffirm our confidence in the acquired knowledge. Building a formal framework provides a
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favourable environment for reaching new analytical and computational results, thus accelerating the outcome
of new predictions that can be firmly settled within the scientific knowledge after hypothesis testing.
One of the most interesting challenges in scientific modelling relies on complex systems, which are systems
composed by a large number of entities driven by non-linear interactions between their components and with
the environment. In particular, complex systems may lead to the observation of one of the most controversial
phenomena in modern sciences: emergent behaviours. A good intuition for emergence arises when we observe
in a complex system that it “begins to exhibit genuinely novel properties that [at a first sight]1are irreducible to,
and neither predictable nor explainable in terms of, the properties of their constituents”[5]. Among this kind
of collective behaviours we find phenomena such as magnetism, patterns observed in dissipative systems like
hurricanes or convection cells or, in biological systems, patterns on animal skins or flocking behaviour. Looking
at these examples it seems that the difficulty relies in an apparent discontinuity between emergent properties
and their microscopic description. Since a basic tenet in the scientific method is that macroscopic properties
are the consequence of the lower level constituents a critical question arises here [6]: how is it possible to obtain
a satisfactory conceptual representation of emergent macroscopic behaviours when the definition of emergence
apparently implies a discontinuity between the microscopic and the macroscopic representation?
Explaining the origin of this discontinuity has led to the famous controversy between vitalist and reduction-
ists positioning [7, 3]. We are not interested in entering into this debate, because we do not aim to understand
which are the mechanisms making that an emergent property arises. We accept that emergent properties exists
and that they are the consequence of the interactions of its lower level properties and the environment –thus
we do not accept a compositional physicalism but an explanatory physicalism [2] (otherwise obvious in our
view). We are rather interested in answering which are the properties that a complex system may have (and, in
particular, those exhibiting emergent behaviours) for being more or less accessible to our knowledge applying
the scientific method. In this sense, we align with the proposal of de Haan [8], who highlights the necessity of
a general epistemological framework in which emergence can be addressed.
An interesting condition for epistemic accessibility was proposed by Bedau when he coined the term weak
emergence for those emergent processes that are epistemologically accessible only by simulation [9]. The idea is
that a simulation would demonstrate the supervenience of upper level properties from lower level constituents,
even if the mechanistic process leading to the observed pattern is not completely understood, i.e. it is not
possible to compress the simulation into a compact set of rules explaining how the outcome is determined.
Therefore, it provides an objective definition of emergence based on computational incompressibility, that has
been explored by different models such as cellular automata [10, 11] or genetic algorithms [12], approximations
that were later called computational emergence [13].
Nevertheless, Bedau pointed out as well that, even if there is computational incompressibility, it could be
possible to recover from the simulations regularities that may lead to describe the system under compacts laws
[9]. Otherwise, the above computational approximations should be understood as non-epistemic, as they would
be useless to decipher the principles governing the emergence of a property. Furthermore, Huneman rightly
emphasized that this is an important issue to understand the relationship between computational models and
processes observed in nature [14] and, for those computational models depicting regularities in their global
behaviour, coined the term robustly emergent.
There is a last notion of emergence we would like to discuss that has been considered fundamental –as
opposed to epistemological–, which is called strong emergence [15]. In Physics it is accepted that knowing
the positions and velocities of particles is sufficient to determine the pairwise interactions. This assumption is
frequently found in Physics-inspired models of collective behaviour, where individual motion results from aver-
aging responses to each neighbour considered separately. Nevertheless, Bar-Yam reasoned that this assertion
would not hold if the system is embedded in responsive media –such as the motions of impurities embedded in
a solid–, or in any process where global optimization (instead of local) is involved. In this way, if there is in
the system a constraint acting on every component simultaneously and it is strong enough –i.e. it is a global
constraint–, it is not possible to determine the state of the system considering only pairwise interactions. In
some sense, the parts are determined downwards from the state of the whole, being the consciousness the most
paradigmatic example suggested for strong emergence.
In this paper, we are interested in understanding which are the conditions that a natural system depicting an
1The statement in brackets is ours because, although we think that this definition provides a good intuition on emergent
processes, we agree with Mitchell in that it is simplistic [2]. We rather adhere to the view of Francis Crick when he explains
that “The scientific meaning of emergent, or at least the one I use, assumes that, while the whole may not be the simple sum
of its separate parts, its behaviour can, at least in principle, be understood from the nature and behaviour of its parts plus the
knowledge of how all these parts interact” (reproduced from [3] referring to [4] p.11)
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emergent property may have for fitting the notion of robust emergence. However, we will shift the attention from
computational models to focus on the analysis of experimental data. We will follow the view in which emergence
is considered a “relation between descriptions of models of natural systems and not between properties of
an objective reality in itself” [16] although, as we will see immediately, we will not renounce to talk about
ontology. In particular, we aim to understand the relation between macroscopic descriptions of emergent
behaviours and their microscopic explanatory models. Starting from experimentally characterized microscopic
states associated to a macroscopic emergent observation, we want to understand which kind of regularities found
in these microstates are more difficult to compress and why. We believe that this is a necessary a priori step
for any computational approach aiming to model the observed process, and thus scientifically relevant notions
of emergence should be derived from this process rather than from the computational models themselves.
An immediate risk in this endeavour is that we must select a framework to work with and, by doing this,
any result may depend on the framework selected. To circumvent this difficulty, we will apply a framework
founded in logic whose limits are thus clearly established. In particular, we will analyse with logical principles
the map between the conceptual setting build by an observer following the scientific method and the objects
observed. As a consequence, we will be able to clearly see why and how this limits are surpassed, and this map
will help us to recover the ontological meaning of these limitations.
The article is articulated as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the formalism. We carefully provide a
definition of system, introducing next the different mathematical tools needed and finally providing a topological
notion of conceptual vagueness. We will show here that well known difficulties discussed around the concept
of emergence [7, 17, 18, 8, 9, 19], can be understood through this notion of vagueness. Thus, our effort
in the application of a novel formalism becomes justified because we find a more expressive picture of the
epistemological problems we face when dealing with complex systems and their ontological origins. We analyse
in Section 3 the macroscopic and microscopic descriptions, showing how the macroscopic descriptions are more
prone to generate vague concepts while the (bottom-up) microscopic description is used to build explanatory
frameworks. It is in Section 4 where we will show how the knowledge subject proceeds to build such a framework,
and we discuss how concept disjunction helps us in the identification of the system’s constraints. Then we go
into three synthetic systems in which, applying the new formalism, we identify which are the properties that
make the system more or less epistemologically accessible. We finish in section 5 discussing the limitations of
our approach, and how to elucidate which is the complexity of the constraints underlying the system under
analysis despite of these limitations, what lead us to propose a definition of emergence strength.
2 A topological description of the phase space induced by measurable
properties
In the following sections we introduce a novel application of topological notions, whose novelty relies on its
ability to formally describe epistemological questions that are hardly addressed by other approximations. A
nice introduction for computational scientists to the generalization of the approach presented here, called formal
topology, can be found in [20], and a relevant application to the epistemological determination of what should
be understood as a vague concept is found in [21].
2.1 System definition
We start proposing a glossary of terms concerning the system definition, some of them close to those proposed
by Ryan in [17]. We will call (object of) observation oi, to a set of basic magnitudes associated to a given entity.
Each of this magnitudes is a function fM of the Cartesian product of a collection of M sets –where at least one
of them is determined by an experimental measurement–, into real numbers R, i.e. fM : A×B× ...×M → R.
The non measurable sets may refer to a set of measurement units (grams, meters,...) to a set of reference
frameworks, or any other set necessary to determine the final magnitude. For simplicity, we will consider that
any variation in the magnitudes is a consequence of a variation in the outcome of a measurement and thus,
in the following, we will not distinguish between magnitude and measurement when objects of observation are
discussed.
In this way, we will consider that our system is characterized by a bunch ofM quantitative and/or qualitative
(i.e. binary) magnitudes X = {xk, k = 1, ..,M}. Given that we are interested in complex systems, we will
consider that our system consists of a large number of entities, that we denote with N . We will call scope to
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this selection of objects whose size, N , implicitly determines the spatio-temporal boundaries of the system.
Determining the scope is already a difficult task for large dynamical systems. These difficulties arise, on the one
hand, from the identification of these entities because, when the number is large, a complete characterization
may be unfeasible. On the other hand, it will be also difficult to define the separation between system and
environment, as this separation cannot be achieved many times using strictly objective arguments [22, 23]. We
will discuss these questions in more detail below.
The variables selected X are intended to be sufficient to answer the questions addressed in the research.
For simplicity in the exposition, we start considering an ideal scenario in which all these variables can be
quantified for any entity within the system, leading to N ×M specific values. This assumption will not affect
our conclusions, as we can assign a vanishing value to any variable from which the associated magnitude is
not observed for one or several entities. We will propose a procedure to relax this assumption in section 5.2 to
discuss how the complexity of a system can be explored following the scientific method.
Every variable xk has a resolution rk = f : xk → R, which is the finest interval of variation that we set
for that variable, and it is established from different arguments. For instance, the resolution may be limited
by the intrinsic error in the measurement, which would be an ontological limitation. Another possibility arises
when the expected influence of a given variable on the system’s description is small for a given shift in the
value, and a coarser discretization is then justified (an epistemological limitation). Calling Ik to the domain of
the function f : xk → R, the number of possible values considered for the variable xk will be ζk = Ik/rk. We
will call resolution R of the system to the finest variation that allow us to distinguish two states of the system,
R = maxk({ζk}) (k = 1, ..,M).
This choice of variables together with the set of viable values will be called the focus F of the knowledge
subject, upper bounded by F ∼ M × R. We finally call the scale to the set of specific values {N,M,R}.
A factor multiplying any of these values represents a change in the scale of the scope (if we modify N), or
the focus (if we modify M or R). Note that, following this definition, the scale is an ontological attribute as
determined by N , but it also depends on the epistemological attributes determined by M and R. Therefore,
the breadth of the focus is very much influenced by epistemological choices. Interestingly, it has been suggested
that emergent behaviours (theories) are the consequence of a change in the scope [17] (and not in the focus
[19]).
2.2 Measurable properties, concepts and their extension.
Let us start introducing some definitions, most of them already provided and justified in [21], that we recover
here for completeness. For the sake of simplicity we will start considering that our objects of observation
o ∈ O are the components of a complex system at a given time, i.e. we focus on a single microstate µ with N
components described by M variables with resolution R. Each of these components is what we consider for the
moment an object of observation. We will move later towards a description where each object of observation
is a microstate, becoming the whole space of objects the observed phase space. All the definitions considered
in the following for a single microstate can be extended for other objects with a different scale.
Definition: We call a basic concept or characteristic ca = x
∗
k to the specific value x
∗
k of a
variable xk, out of the ζk possible values, measured over an object of observation o. In this way,
if we consider two different measurements of our variables for the same entity, each of them will constitute a
different object of observation.
Definition: We call focus F to the whole set of characteristics considered by the observer:
F = {xlk; k = 1, ..,M ; l = 1, .., ζk} ≡ {ca; a = 1, .., M˜}, with M˜ = M ×
∑
k ζk. We make explicit here the
discrete nature of the conceptual setting and the relation between resolution and focus, which achieves a suitable
description in terms of characteristics, in turn leading to the definition of concepts. Note that discreteness here is
not an arbitrary choice, because we are working with experimental values that have associated an experimental
error, making the measurements essentially discrete. The transition into continuous descriptions is a posterior
formal abstraction made during the modelling process.
Definition: We call a concept ν to any non-empty finite subset of F : ν = {c1, ..., cP }, with P ≤ M˜ .
We defined the intension of concepts. Given that a concept may contain a single characteristic, ν = {c}, any
characteristic can be considered a concept as well. The distinction between concept and characteristic will be
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needed in certain circumstances to indicate a qualitative difference that makes a concept a more elaborated
entity. For instance, a characteristic may be the outcome of a measurement and a concept could be the result
of that measurement together with its units. Therefore, the term characteristic will be used to talk about
elementary concepts (such as single measurements outcomes) but, apart from its utility in making precise the
definitions, this distinction is not necessary for our purposes and, for the sake of a simplified exposition, both
terms will be used interchangeably.
2.3 Binary operations
From the previous definitions it is immediate to propose binary operations to build new concepts.
Definition: (Conjunction of concepts). Let ν1 = {c1, ..., cP } and ν2 = {d1, ..., dQ} be two concepts.
Then, the conjunction of v1and v2 is the concept
ν1 ∧ ν2 = {c1, ..., cP , d1, ..., dQ} (1)
The conjunction of concepts is, in turn, a concept which consists on the set of all the characteristics contained
in both concepts. Alternatively, we may want to extract, given two concepts, the common characteristics they
share:
Definition: (Disjunction of concepts). Let ν1 = {c1, ..., cP , b1, ..., bL} and ν2 = {d1, ..., dQ, b1, ..., bL}
be two concepts. Then the disjunction of v1and v2 is the concept
ν1 ∨ ν2 = {b1, ..., bL} (2)
The disjunction of concepts leads to a concept containing the set of all characteristics common to both
concepts. Note that the set of concepts we consider determines a partition of the focus and it will induce, in
turn, a partition in the set of objects of observation. In other words, understanding the relationship between
these partitions requires to determine a constitutive relationship between any single characteristic belonging
to the focus F and the set of objects O. The following constitutive relationship will express that the objects
become cognitively significant by means of the characteristics measured and, in turn, by the concepts we build
from them:
Definition: (Constitution relation). Let F be the focus over a set O of objects. Given o ∈ O
and ν ∈ F , we introduce a binary relation, , that we call constitution relation, such that by
o  ν we mean that ν is one of the concepts constituting o.
With the constitution relation we determine how the objects of observation are expressed via the conceptual
apparatus of the knowing subject. In addition, we would like to know which objects are constituted by a given
concept:
Definition: (Extension of a concept). Let ν ∈ F be a concept. Then the extension Ext of ν is
the subset of objects of O constituted by ν, that is
Ext(ν) = {o ∈ O | o  ν} (3)
We note here that an immediate consequence of Eq. 3 is that any object of observation has necessarily
associated a concept, i.e. it is just cognitively accessible by means of the conceptual apparatus of the knowing
subject. This assertion, if accepted in general, leads to a Kantian epistemological positioning [21]. In our case,
it is a consequence of the fact that our objects of observation are built from measurements of a reproducible
experimental setting, and hence it is true by construction. Nevertheless, the opposite is not true as we may
deal with concepts for which no object is observed, i.e. Ext(ν) = ∅. These concepts are considered for instance
if we have a priori expectations of the viable values of the system2.
Finally, we aim to know what is the extension of a subset U of concepts U = {{ν1}, ..., {νL}}.
2For instance, we know that a group of birds can fly following any direction in the space even if we systematically observe that
they follow a single direction. From the point of view of the scientific method, concepts build from a priori expectations are very
important, as they may be used to propose null hypothesis which, in general, can be formulated as H0 : ”ν observed". It is when
we reject the hypothesis through experiments when we acquire a scientific knowledge of the process analysed, i.e. that ν is not
observed.
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Lemma: Let U be a subset of the set F of concepts. Then, the extension of U is defined by
setting
Ext(U) =
⋃
ν∈U
Ext(ν) (4)
Hence, if we consider two concepts c1 and c2, we should not confuse a concept built by conjunction of
concepts c = c1 ∧ c2 with the subset of concepts C = {{c1}, {c2}}. In the former case, we look for objects
containing both concepts and, thus, the number of such objects is smaller or equal than the number of objects
described by c1 or c2. On the other hand, the subset C extends over objects containing any of the concepts,
being its extension the union of the extension of both concepts. In this paper, we will analyse sets of objects
and we will be interested not only in finding a description that would allow us to “talk” about them but, in
addition, we will look for minimal descriptions, i.e. descriptions containing the lowest number of concepts. We
will show below that disjunction is the basic logical operation we need to obtain such representations.
2.4 Topology and vagueness
We introduce now some more definitions and a theorem, which represent the basis of the topological approach
[21].
Theorem 1: If the map Ext satisfies the extension condition, then the family {Ext(U)|U ⊆ F}
is a topology over the set O, where U is a subset of concepts of the focus F .
This map is central in our arguments. The basic characteristics are defined in terms of measurements over
specific objects, and thus the extension provides a map between these characteristics and the sets of objects. If
we call power set ℘ to the set containing all the possible partitions in which a given set (in our case O) can be
divided, a topology will be some subset of the power set containing a collection of sets called open sets –which
include the empty set and the whole set–, and verifying: 1) the arbitrary union of open sets is another open
set in the topology; 2) The binary intersection of open sets is also another open set in the topology. Therefore,
a topology is a subset of ℘ which is closed under arbitrary union and binary intersection of the open sets it
contains.
What we are expressing is that, once we have a conceptual setting built from measurements, the extension
function induces a partition in the set of objects, and this partition fulfils the conditions for being a topology.
In this way ,we can take advantage of the topological notions of open and closed sets. Justification for the
following definitions can be found in [24, 21]
Definition: (Open set) Let A be a subset of the set O of objects. Then A is an open set if it
coincides with its interior Int(A), where
Int(A) = {o ∈ O | (∃ν ∈ F ) o  ν & ext(ν) ⊆ A}. (5)
Definition: (Closed set) Let A be a subset of the set O of objects. Then A is a closed set if it
coincides with its closure Cl(A), where
Cl(A) = {o ∈ O | (∀ν ∈ F ) o  ν ⇒ (∃o ∈ O) o ∈ ext(ν) & o ∈ A}. (6)
Definition: (Border) Let A be a subset of the set O of objects. Then the border Bd(A) of A is
the set
Bd(A) = Cl(A) ∩ A¯ (7)
where A¯ stands for the complement of the set A with respect to O.
Definition: (Vagueness) Let ν be any concept and U be any set of concepts. Then ν is a vague
concept if Bd(Ext(ν)) is non-empty, and U is a vague set of concepts if Bd(Ext(U)) is non-empty.
As we anticipated, this definition of vagueness will help us to understand the origin of ambiguities associated
to the definition of emergence.
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3 Vagueness and descriptions of the system
3.1 Microscopic and macroscopic descriptions
Following the definitions introduced we aim now to differentiate two types of variables providing a description
of the system at different scales: microscopic and macroscopic. Note that with microscopic we do not mean
“atomistic”, we just talk about a significantly shorter spatio-temporal scale of observation of the system. A par-
ticular feature of the interplay between both scales is that, when a macroscopic property is observed during the
dynamical evolution of a system, even if the microscopic variables are continuously changing, the macroscopic
variables remain invariant.
In the following, we will call microstate µ to a vector containing, at a given time, the values of a set of
variables {xk} that fully determines the state of the microscopic objects, i.e. µ = {x
∗
k} where x
∗
k stands for
a particular value of the variable xk. Therefore, the basic objects of observation we are considering now are
the microstates o ≡ µ. When a coarse graining of the microstates at the spatial, temporal or both dimensions
is performed, it may be possible to determine macroscopic variables yk describing the state of the system
in the new (coarser) scale. We will call macrostates to the objects described at the macro scale o ≡ ξ. In
some cases, the macroscopic variables yk can be obtained applying a surjective map f over the microscopic
variables f(xk) → yk. For instance, if we deal with an incomplete (statistical) microscopic description of an
ensemble P (µ), we can obtain a coarse determination of a macroscopic variable yk averaging the correspondent
microscopic variable xk weighted by the statistical probability of the microstates over the ensemble 〈xk(µ)P (µ)〉.
But in many other situations it is not possible to find out such mapping, and we argue here that this fact
underlies the problems surrounding the study of emergent properties: we observe a macroscopic property such
as the collective behaviour of many interacting elements, and it does not seem possible to explain it from lower
levels of description (for instance from the properties of the entities themselves).
It is important to underlie that macrostates and microstates definitions are relative to the scale of observation
and they may change if we move from one scale of description to another. Consider a system described within
a certain temporal scale by a set of microstates {µi} which are associated to the observation of a single
macrostate ξ. Assume now that the system evolves under a sufficiently long path such that we observe different
macrostates and we store T snapshots of this dynamics, leading to an ensemble of macrostates {ξu}Tu=1. It
is possible to consider that each of these macrostates is now a microstate µˆ for a new system with a larger
scope and lower resolution ξu → µˆi. Given that the scope of a macrostate will be always larger than that of a
microstate (Nξ ≥ Nµ), whereas it occurs the opposite with the resolution (Rξ ≤ Rµ), in this exercise we have
increased the scope and reduced the resolution. This is the reason why, larger is the scale, more difficult is to
build a bottom-up explanatory framework. This movement along different scales will be very relevant when
evolutionary systems are considered, given that we will need to distinguish at least two spatial and temporal
scales. For instance, such a change is needed when moving from the ecological analysis of few individuals to
the evolutionary analysis of entire populations.
Note as well that this change in the scale requires an effort to reduce the system description, but this
kind of reduction has been performed from the very first step: for the definition of scope, we have neglected
entities; for the focus, we have neglected variables and probably restricted their viable values assuming a
lower resolution. Furthermore, any map between microstates and macrostates again considers a reduction
in the information provided by the microstates. In general, for both very broad or very detailed questions
the technical complexity increases and a reduction in the description is unavoidable, and it is important to
remark that this exercise does not mean that the approach is reductionist. Reductionism should be considered
an epistemological attitude where it is accepted that any macroscopic description is a simple extrapolation
of the properties of the microscopic description [25]. Instead, we accept that in complex systems there are
discontinuities between the different levels of description and that, for each new level, new properties may
arise. We are interested here in investigating which are the minimum conditions to say that a microscopic
description is a valid representation of an emergent macroscopic observation.
3.2 Vagueness in the macroscopic description and dialectic concepts
In this section, we aim to justify with a simple example a plausible origin for the controversies around emergent
properties. Importantly, we will not provide any a priori definition of emergent property. For the moment,
we just assume that there are processes that are sufficiently surprising for any observer as to qualify them as
emergent. We argue that, given that the macroscopic scale is less refined in terms of number of variables and
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values, it is more prone to generate dialectic concepts. Therefore, we expect that it is in the macroscopic scale
where emergent properties are first identified.
Let’s start considering a simple example where we investigate a complex system for which two different
concepts can be built macroscopically. The first concept cˆΩ describes the performance of the complex system
when it is able to visit every possible viable values of the focus, and thus the subscript Ω indicates that it
describes a behaviour found for any microstate of the phase space, i.e. it is not constrained. Remember that
we use the hat over the concept to denote that it is a macroscopic concept. For concreteness, let us assume that
the concept is cˆΩ = "groups of birds flying". Now consider that, from time to time, we observe that these birds
depict a swarming (or flocking) behaviour and we coin an specific concept for this cˆE = "flocking", where the
subscript E stands for “emergent”, just because we find the behaviour novel and appealing. If we call {oE} to
the observations where we appreciate a flocking behaviour and {oNE} to those where we do not, the conceptual
setting describing the system will be:
Ext(cˆ0) = ∅
Ext(cˆE) = {oE}
Ext(cˆΩ) = {oE, oNE}.
where cˆ0 is the concept describing the null observation of the system. According with the previous defi-
nitions, Bd(cˆE) = {oNE} and we identify cˆE as a vague concept. The fact that the border of the concept is
the set of observations not depicting flocking {oNE} behaviour means that we are still not good at explaining
why these observations do not belong to the set of observations that do show flocking behaviour {oE}. As a
consequence, the set {oNE} cannot be safely separated from {oE}. The reason is that the concept cˆE is still
not informative of what “flocking” means and, as a consequence, we cannot use it to say what does not mean,
what would help us in separating both sets (i.e. we cannot properly build a concept cˆNE = ¬cˆE, where ¬ is the
NOR operator). This is indeed an important question to work under the scientific method, because we need
to establish hypothesis of the type H0 : "d observed" which, upon rejection, lead to the concept c = ¬d (d is
not observed).
David Bohm pointed out that, in the earlier stages of any science, the interest is focused on “the basic
qualities and properties that define the mode of being of the things treated in that science” [26], being tasks
such as comparative analysis and classification the cornerstones in its earlier development. We argue, that it
is in a descriptive (exploratory) context in which the larger number of vague concepts arise. Following the
classification of concepts proposed by Georgescu-Roegen [27] we will refer to concepts containing any source of
vagueness as dialectic. To this type belong breadth concepts [28], those related with dynamical properties like
stability [29], the difference between organism and machine [30] or the exact intension of function, autopoiesis
and complexity [7]. These are classical examples of dialectic concepts and it is remarkable the potential these
concepts have for generating debate, which should be considered an asset [31].
To continue with Bohm’s view on scientific evolution, it is just after a sufficient exploitation of the dialectic
knowledge when we will find a growing interest on “processes in which things have become what they are,
starting out from what they once were, and in which they continue to change and to become something else in
the future” [26]. This knowledge, following again the classification of concepts proposed by Georgescu-Roegen, is
built on arithmomorphic concepts: “[arithmomorphic concepts] conserve a differentiate individuality identical
in all aspects to that of a natural number within the sequence of natural numbers”[27]. Arithmomorphic
concepts are suitable for formal reasoning and quantitative treatment, and we argue that emergent processes
are dialectic macroscopically, and that intense research is developed around them upon a successful microscopic
arithmomorphic scheme is built.
3.3 Microscopic description and arithmomorphic scheme
Microscopically, when {oNE} is observed the system depicts a dynamical evolution where constraints are absent.
Constraints here should be simply understood as limitations in the viable values of the variables we handle
[32]. Any system is constrained in some extent. But there are some constraints that belong to the definition
of the system itself, that we will call intrinsic, and others that depend on particular conditions to be observed,
that we will call facultative. Think in the structural differences between a protein, and a heteropolymer whose
sequence is the result of randomly shuffling the protein sequence. Although both chains of amino-acids depict
the same number of intrinsic constraints (those derived from the existence of peptidic bonds), a protein structure
requires three additional constraints levels: the first is needed for being kinetically foldable in a biologically
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relevant time, the second for making the fold thermodynamically stable under physiological conditions, and
the third for performing its specific function (metal-binding, phosphorilation, etc.). Both chains have the same
amino-acids but the evolutionary process has selected for an specific order in the sequence that generates the
constraints needed to make possible that the emergent property (the protein function) arises. Quantitatively,
the probability that these constraints appear by chance is quite low: the number of possible heteropolymers
of length N , considering an alphabet of 20 amino-acids, is 20N and the number of protein structures (of any
length) deposited at date in the Protein Data Bank is ∼ 1.2 × 105 (www.pdb.org). If we call {µE} the set of
microstates where the emergent behaviour is observed, {µNE} the region where it is not observed, and Ω the
whole phase space, we expect that #{Ω} ≈ #{µNE} ≫ #{µE}; where #{·} is the cardinality of the set, i.e. the
number of elements it contains. Therefore, we expect that the volume of the region of the phase space were an
emergent property arises to be much smaller than the whole phase space. This is probably why unpredictability
or surprise are attributes frequently used for emergent properties.
Recovering the example of Sec. 3.2 we know that the following map between the macroscopic description
and the underlying processes exists:
Ext(cˆ0) = ∅
Ext(cˆE) = {µE}
Ext(cˆΩ) = {{µNE}, {µE}}.
Again, the concept cˆE determines an open whose closure is the whole phase space Cl(Ext(cˆE) = {µE}) =
{{µNE}, {µE}}. The intersection between the closure and this open determines its border Bd(Ext(cˆE) =
{µE}) = {µNE} which is non-empty which, as we have seen, means that the concept cˆE is a vague concept.
Getting into the microscopic description, vagueness will vanish if we build a topology such as:
Ext(c0) = ∅
Ext(cE) = {µE}
Ext(cNE) = {µNE}
Ext(cΩ) = {{µNE}, {µE}}
where cNE = ¬cE. In the examples we develop in the next sections, we will call generically to the positive
(null) observation with the concepts c (d). For all the systems analyzed, we will assume that some microstates
correspond to a macroscopic emergent observation, and vagueness removal will be achieved when we are able to
find a subset of concepts U such that Ext(UNE) = {µNE}, which means that, when only the emergent process
is observed Ext(UNE) = ∅, we reject the hypothesis H0 : ”UNE is observed”. Therefore, in the following section
we aim to investigate how we can build a microscopic arithmomorphic description looking for microscopic
concepts that allow us to differentiate between the sets of microstates {µE} and {µNE}.
4 A synthetic approximation to emergent properties
4.1 Traceability and compact descriptions
With the above considerations, we propose two formal definitions that will be helpful to understand our rational
behind the further development of the paper. We first define what is considered a novel macroscopic property,
which identification is typically the starting point of any research.
Definition: (Novel macroscopic property). We will say that an observed macroscopic property
is a novel property if it is observed only in the presence of certain facultative constraints limiting
the viable values of the system.
Therefore, given that the phase space of the system Ω is restricted to a smaller observed region ΩO ⊂ Ω,
what we say is that there exists a macroscopic concept cˆ such that Ext(cˆ) = ΩO, and we would like to explore
this region both in terms of macroscopic {cˆ} and microscopic {c} concepts. We now introduce a condition that
allow us to consider that a macroscopic description is in correspondence with a microscopic description.
Definition: (Traceability). Given a novel macroscopic property cˆ and the observed phase
space ΩO associated to that property, i.e. Ext(cˆ) = ΩO, we will say that the macroscopic descrip-
tion obtained is traceable if we find an appropriate function or algorithm applied on microscopic
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properties f : {c} → q such that the new concept q derived compactly describes the ensemble of
microstates, i.e. Ext(q) = Ext(cˆ) = ΩO.
This definition paves the way for quantifying the correspondence between both descriptions within the frame-
work proposed. Note that it does not require to be able to relate macroscopic and microscopic properties,
but only to establish a correspondence between microscopic and macroscopic variables describing the same
region of the observed phase space ΩO. Therefore, traceability can be seen as a rather minimal epistemological
condition, because it is what allow us to talk about emergent properties circumventing any epistemological
discontinuity between both descriptions. Still, we need to clarify what is understood by compact description.
Definition: (Compact description)We say that a set of distinguishable microstates {µ}, namely
a set in which every microstate µ is completely described through the microscopic set of concepts
F , is compactly described by a concept q, if Ext(q) = {µ} and the number of concepts needed
to build q is strictly smaller than F . In the next sections we show with different examples how can be
achieved a compact description in order to say that a novel macroscopic property is traceable.
4.2 Identification of constraints: focusing on disjunction
In this section, we would like to investigate if there is any general method to reach a compact description of
the ensemble of microstates. As we said, when an emergent property is observed, the system is constrained to
a certain region of the phase space. This means that there is a breaking of symmetry, namely the probability
distribution for values of the different variables depart from the distribution observed when the system is free
of constraints, thus losing ergodicity [33] (p. 186). Therefore, the existence of facultative external or internal
constraints limit the behaviour of the system and, as we will attempt to clarify, a necessary condition for
determining a microscopic property associated to every microstate visited requires the determination of the
existing constraints. We will see that the nature of the different constraints acting on the system determine its
epistemological accessibility and, thus, our ability to reach a satisfactory explanation of emergent behaviours.
Firstly, we show how can be obtained the extension of those concepts built through binary operations over
sets of concepts. When we obtain a new concept τ via conjunction, for instance τ = ν1 ∧ ν2, the extension
of the new concept will be the intersection of the sets of objects associated to each of the starting concepts
Ext(τ) = Ext(ν1) ∩ Ext(ν2). Aiming to fully identify a single object requires to determine a sufficiently large
number of concepts in order to sharply separate it from the other objects, being conjunction the basic operation
that permits to reach more precise descriptions.
Let us take as an example the description of a set of proteins {oα} provided by the sequence of their amino-
acid composition, which is embedded within an evolutionary phase space. Each amino-acid molecule in the
protein is a component of the system which is described by its position in the sequence and by a single variable
whose specific value consists of one out of the 20 natural amino-acids encoded by DNA. In this way, an example
of concept within this description would be something like νi =“cysteine in position i” –which, in turn, is built
by conjunction of the more basic characteristics “cysteine” and “i”–. A protein sequence oα will be subsequently
built by conjunction of a set of such a kind of concepts describing the amino-acid observed at each position,
i.e α = (ν1 ∧ ν2 ∧ ... ∧ νN ) (see Fig. 1). The sequence becomes uniquely determined under this description,
i.e. the extension of the sequence maps exactly one object of observation, namely, the protein under study:
Ext(ν1 ∧ ν2 ∧ ... ∧ νN ) = Ext(α) = oα. In summary, conjunction underlies bottom-up approximations, where
we focus in an accurate description through the compilation of concepts.
Let us now have a look to another kind of concepts λ, which are obtained via disjunction, λ = ν1 ∨ ν2.
Following the equation 2, given that ν1 = {c1, ..., cP , b1, ..., bL} and ν2 = {d1, ..., dQ, b1, ..., bL}, the extension
of the concept λ = {b1, ..., bL} will be given by Ext(λ) = Exti<j(bi ∧ bj) (see Fig. 1). From this definition
we note that Ext({{ν1}, {ν2}}) = Ext(ν1) ∪ Ext(ν2) ⊆ Ext(ν1 ∨ ν2). Hence, this is an operation that allow
us to find commonalities, which may be extended to objects that are not included in the sets of objects over
which the concepts ν1 and ν2 are extended. Disjunction stands out as a relevant operation to look for breadth
concepts, and it is consistent with the intuition stating that these concepts tend to overtake the boundaries of
our starting focus.
4.3 The three bits system
We are already equipped with all the tools necessary for analysing in detail a synthetic example. The toy
model we consider consists on a system of three entities whose physical state is described by a single binary
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Figure 1: Illustration of conjunction and disjunction of concepts. Starting from the knowledge subject’s
conceptual apparatus (greek letters, left), two sequences α1 and α2 are built through conjunction of the basic
concepts, being themselves concepts (center). These sequences uniquely determine a single object, for instance
a protein sequence, and thus #(Ext(αi)) = 1. By comparison of both sequences we observe two common
concepts (linked by dotted lines) that we extract through binary disjunction leading to a concept α12 (right)
containing less basic concepts but whose extension is larger than the original sequences (#(Ext(α12)) = 2)
being its scope larger. In the case of proteins it may be understood as a signature of their common ancestry,
i.e. of their homology.
variable, i.e. a system modelled with three bits. From an experimental point of view, there may be three
distinguishable entities (ranging from a molecule to a population) described with binary variables. We can
think in sets of genes that are expressed (not expressed) when the amount of the correspondent protein is
above (below) certain threshold, species observed (absent) in certain environmental sample or, from a strictly
computational experiment, the attractor of a boolean network. Each measurement performed over these entities
will be considered an observation, and each of them may take a value of one or zero. For a system composed
by three entities we can observe 23 = 8 microstates µk = (x1, x2, x3) (with k = 1, .., 8; and xi = {0, 1}; see
table 1). As the three entities can be distinguished the focus is
c1 =
′ ON at object 1′; d1 =
′ OFF at object 1′;
c2 =
′ ON at object 2′; d2 =
′ OFF at object 2′;
c3 =
′ ON at object 3′; d3 =
′ OFF at object 3′;
Each microstate is defined in terms of this focus through concepts ek (k = 1, ..., 8) built by conjunction of
characteristics. For instance, the microstate µ7 = (1, 1, 0) is defined in terms of the basic characteristics
as e7 = c1 ∧ c2 ∧ d3, being in turn a concept. The fact that we work with elementary concepts build from
measurements in which both the observation or not of certain property can be assessed experimentally, stands on
the basis of the construction of a bottom-up explanatory framework. The observation of a “flocking behaviour”
cannot be assessed experimentally unless we clearly determine measurable values. A bottom-up characterization
in terms, for instance, of the relative angles in the positions between birds allow us to tackle the vagueness
associated to the term “flocking”. Furthermore, it has been claimed that flocking is not observed in a single
microstate [17]. However, once we have characterized flocking with microscopic variables, for example once we
derive the pairwise distribution of interactions among neighbours [34], we can also test whether any behaviour,
even for a single snapshot in the flight of a group of birds, is consistent with the model derived. This fact
already provides the means to build an hypothesis testing experiment where the null hypothesis is that the
group of birds do not present flocking behaviour.
We can define for the three-bits system
(
N
next
)
possible combinations of constraints involving next variables,
and thus the number of final microstates will depend on the number of constraints and their scope, i.e. the
number of elements influenced by the constraint. In the following, we consider examples with a different number
and type of constraints, all resulting in the same number of microstates (four out of the eight viable states).
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Table 1: Microstates of a three-bits system.
Microstate
µ1 = (1, 1, 1) µ5 = (0, 1, 1)
µ2 = (1, 0, 0) µ6 = (1, 0, 1)
µ3 = (0, 1, 0) µ7 = (1, 1, 0)
µ4 = (0, 0, 1) µ8 = (0, 0, 0)
Table 2: Three bits microstates associated to the region of the phase space where an emergent property was
observed {µE}, for a system with a single constraint of scope one.
{µE}
µ1 = (1, 1, 1)
µ2 = (1, 0, 0)
µ6 = (1, 0, 1)
µ7 = (1, 1, 0)
Hence, these constraints are codified in one bit of information, but we will see that the number of concepts
needed to express these constraints can change from system to system.
The most simple macroscopic description associated to the observed ensemble, arises if we consider a coarse
graining of the microscopic properties such that there is a surjective map between microstates and macrostates
a macroscopic variable takes the value ′ON ′ if these microstates are visited and ′OFF ′ otherwise. In this
way, only if there is a statistically significant bias towards these microstates we can say that a novel emergent
macroscopic property is observed.
Taking these considerations in mind, we aim to disentangle the microscopic constraints in the system follow-
ing our formalism. Given that we build our conceptual setting starting from the basic characteristics (obtained
from measurements) and then performing binary logical operations, we expect that the results obtained for the
different systems are fairly comparable. We will perform this comparison taking into account the number of
propositions found and the concepts contained, i.e. analysing whether the respective representations provide a
more or less compact description. Therefore, a valid description for the constraints should represent a reduction
of dimensionality of the system (a compact description), as it is a necessary condition to build any simplified
model.
System with a single constraint of scope one (S1). The rational is the same for the following three
systems. We consider that there is an observed macroscopic emergent observation cˆE, and we know the
microstates associated to that particular region of the phase space {µE}. Then, we analyze the set of microstates
looking for its constraints.
The first system we consider is a system where the first bit is constrained to a fixed value (c1), leading to
the observations {µ1, µ2, µ6, µ7} that we explicitly show in table 2.
In order to find the system constraints we start comparing the concepts ei, which determine the different
microstates. We provide a compact representation of these comparisons with a network, see Fig. 2, where
each concept ei is linked with a concept ej if they share a basic concept, c or d. Although the constraints
determine the microstates, these act on the variables so we need to go one step further to identify them. We
move from a network of microstates to a network of basic concepts, and we link two concepts ci or di if they
extend onto the same microstates (see Fig. 2). More formally, we link two concepts ci and cj with a directed
edge if Ext(ci) ⊆ Ext(cj), and with an undirected edge if Ext(ci) ∩ Ext(cj) 6= ∅. In this way, we compactly
represent all the dependencies present in the system represented with relationships of subordination (directed
edges) cooccurrence (undirected) or exclusion (absent link) between the different values. This representation
resembles the information that we would recover if we build a network of variables from a covariance matrix:
positive (negative) correlation arises when similar (dissimilar) values are found between two objects
From the network relating variables in Fig. 2 it is easy to observe that one of the values of the first variable,
d1, is never observed, a fact that we can express with the proposition:
Ext(d1) = ∅
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Figure 2: Representations of a three bits system with a single constraint of scope one. (Left) In
the network, each node represents a microstate and it is linked with another microstate if they share the same
observation for any component, where the number of links represent the number of concepts shared. (Right)
Network of concepts extracted from the analysis of the microstates. Two links ci and cj are linked with a
directed edge if Ext(ci) ⊆ Ext(cj) and with an undirected link if Ext(ci) ∩ Ext(cj) 6= ∅. The concepts are
hierarchically ordered according to the cardinality of their extension, i.e. number of microstates they map. In
this example a single constraint on x1 naturally arises, as one of its possible values maps the empty set.
Table 3: Three bits microstates associated to the region of the phase space where an emergent property was
observed {µE}, for a system with two constraints of scope two.
{µE}
µ1 = (1, 1, 1)
µ4 = (0, 0, 1)
µ5 = (0, 1, 1)
µ8 = (0, 0, 0)
What this proposition simply states is that, in order to identify that a given microstate belongs to this
system, it is necessary to evaluate that the value measured on the first component of the system is different
from zero. In other words, as soon as we reject the hypothesis H0 : "d1 is observed", we will be confident in
that we are dealing with a microstate contained in S1. Note that we achieved a quite important reduction of
the number of concepts needed to talk about the system: from the four concepts {e1, e2, e6, e7}, each of them
containing three basic concepts, we reduce to a subset containing a single concept UE = {c1}. In addition, the
set of non-emergent microstates are well described by the subset UNE = {d1}, what prevents the description
for being vague.
System with two constraints of scope two (S2). We select now four microstates that are obtained
imposing one constraint among each pair of variables. Taking the microstates {µ1, µ4, µ5, µ8} (that are explicitly
shown in table 3), and repeating the procedure of the previous example (see Fig. 3), we observe that the
disconnected components in the graph lead to the following constraints, which can be expressed with the
propositions:
Ext(c1 ∧ d2) = ∅
Ext(c2 ∧ d3) = ∅
Ext(c1 ∧ d3) = ∅
It is easy to observe that one of these constraints is redundant. Given that c2 and d2 cannot be observed
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Figure 3: Representations of a three bits system with two constraints of scope two. (Left) In the
network, each node represents a microstate and it is linked with another microstate if they share the same
observation for any component, where the number of links represent the number of concepts shared. (Right)
Network of concepts extracted from the analysis of the microstates. Two links ci and cj are linked with a
directed edge if Ext(ci) ⊆ Ext(cj) and with an undirected link if Ext(ci) ∩ Ext(cj) 6= ∅. The concepts are
hierarchically ordered according to the cardinality of their extension, i.e. number of microstates they map. In
this example we identify the constraints observing those links that being viable are absent, for instance there
is no link between d3 and c2.
Table 4: Three bits microstates associated to the region of the phase space where an emergent property was
observed {µE}, for a system with a single constraint of scope three.
{µE}
µ1 = (1, 1, 1)
µ2 = (1, 0, 0)
µ3 = (0, 1, 0)
µ4 = (0, 0, 1)
simultaneously, if c1 is observed it means that c2 is also observed and thus d3 cannot be observed. And the
other way around, if d3 is observed c2 will not be observed and thus c1 cannot be observed. Therefore, the
third constraint Ext(c1 ∧ d3) = ∅, is a consequence of the other two. We formulate our result positively saying
that the set of emergent microstates {µE} is described by the subset UE = {{d1 ∧ c2}, {d2 ∧ c3}}, and the set
{µNE} by UNE = {{c1 ∧ d2}, {c2 ∧ d3}}
System with a single constraint of scope three (S3; the parity bit system). Our last example is a
set of microstates having an even number of ON bits, i.e. a single constraint involving all three components.
This system has been previously introduced by Bar-Yam as a toy example of the particular type of emergent
behaviour we introduced above called strong emergence [15]. For this system, given that we find two random
values in two randomly selected bits, the third bit is constrained in such a way that the number of bits in
the microstate is always odd. This rule is used in the control of message transmission, where the last bit
(called the parity bit) is used to monitor the presence of errors in the chain transmitted. Note that we are
not interested in understanding the system under this engineering perspective, as it provides already a rather
ad hoc explanation on how the system is built [35] and, in this work, we assume no a priori knowledge of the
underlying mechanisms generating the observation. It is just one possible observation that will be analysed as
in the previous examples. The microstates we will consider are {µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4}, explicitly shown in table 4
In this case, the network of concepts intuitively resembles an sphere in the sense that there are no “borders”
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Figure 4: Representations of a three bits system with one constraint of scope three. (Left) In the
network, each node represents a microstate and it is linked with another microstate if they share the same
observation for any component, where the number of links represent the number of concepts shared. (Right)
Network of concepts extracted from the analysis of the microstates. Two links ci and cj are linked with a
directed edge if Ext(ci) ⊆ Ext(cj) and with an undirected link if Ext(ci) ∩Ext(cj) 6= ∅. The graph of concepts
is equivalent to the graph we would obtain for a free system, being just observed a reduction in the number of
objects mapped by each concept (from #Ext(·)=4 towards #Ext(·)=2). It reflects the notion that the system
has “no borders”, and no constraints can be explicitly extracted with our framework.
–i.e. disconnected concepts from which propositions about the constraints are simply derived (see figure 4)–.
Thus, the identification of constraints is possible only because we already know the viable values. Indeed, a
parallel analysis of the free system highlights a lower cooccurrence of the different variable values, but there
will be no differences in the final network topology we obtain. This fact would be also observed in the set of
marginal probability distributions, as no bias will be observed for the free system nor for the parity bit system.
The comparison with the free system bring to the surface the following propositions:
Ext(d1 ∧ c2 ∧ c3) = ∅
Ext(c1 ∧ d2 ∧ c3) = ∅
Ext(c1 ∧ c2 ∧ d3) = ∅
Ext(d1 ∧ d2 ∧ d3) = ∅
And what we observe is that the most compact way to talk about this system within this formalism is to write
down all the microstates that are not observed. Therefore, we obtain no reduction of dimensionality at all what
will make difficult to build any model. In this way, vagueness in the macroscopic concept cˆE still holds, because
microstates from {µNE} are getting attracted by those {µE}. More technically, Bd(Ext(cˆE) = {µE}) = {µNE},
again because we do not consider a valid solution for solving vagueness of cˆE simply describing it through the
subset UE = {e1, e2, e3, e4}, because it is not a compact description.
5 Emergence
5.1 The three-bits system in other representations
In the previous examples, we showed how our formalism worked differently depending on the type of constraints
present in the system. We found that it apparently fails in getting a description of the constraints if there
is a single constraint with a scope equal to the system’s size. Of course, we may think that our formalism is
simply insufficient and that there may be other more sophisticated formalisms that would be able to express the
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constraints in S3, with a much lower amount of information that the one we need to describe it. For instance,
there may be a function q such that, given a description of a microstate ei, returns a new type of concepts
c˜ = q(ei) that are able to differentiate the microstates of S3 from the rest. Let’s see this with an example. We
can characterize the three examples above with their probability distributions:
P (µ) = δ(x1, 1)/2
n+1 (S1)
P (µ) = δ(δ(H12 + 1, 1), H23 + 1)/2
n+1 (S2)
P (µ) = δ(mod2(
∑
i xi), 1)/2
n+1 (S3)
where xi is the value of the bit i, n is the number of bits, δ(a,b) is the Kronecker’s delta, Hij = H(xi−xj−1)
is the Heaviside function and mod2(·) is the module two function. In principle, there is no reason to think
that the probability distribution of S3 is more complex than those of S1 and S2. For saying that it should be
any objective reason to say, for instance, that the use of a summation operator and a module function is more
complex than applying two Heaviside functions.
A fairer comparison can be assessed through the algorithmic information complexity (AIC) [36], also known
as Kolmogorov complexity. We approximate this measure programming three simple scripts (one for every
system) that generate strings of size N containing these constraints. In the Appendix, we provide the pseu-
docode for these programs along with some technical details, and the scripts can be found in the Supplementary
Material. Compiling this scripts lead to three binaries which, after compression, have the following ratios of
compression 3.070:1Kb (S1) > 3.011:1Kb (S2) < 2.998:1Kb (S3). With these results, the constraint imple-
mented in S3 requires more information to be codified than those in S2 and S1, suggesting that it is a more
complex constraint. Nevertheless, there is no dramatic difference as to identify it as particularly relevant or
complex. In addition, in the Appendix we discuss that there are some choices in the way we implemented this
exercise that may lead to different results, such as the ability of the subject writing the code.
What we aim to point out with these examples is that, the fact that the formalism we are using here has
established limits, is not a drawback but an advantage to clearly set the boundaries of the framework. For
instance, a desirable property of a framework should be that, if we increase the system’s size, our ability to
describe the constraints of a larger system should change according with their number and scope. If we think
in how these systems will increase the number of microstates when the number of components N increases,
both S1 and S3 will increase as 2N−1 while S2 increases as N + 1. If we use AIC to quantify the constraints,
the same script can generate a small or large string just changing the value of the variable N . According with
our formalism, the number of propositions needed to describe the constraints in the system remains equal to
one for S1, increases as N −1 for S2, and as 2N−1 for S3. We believe that this finding is remarkable and, in the
following sections, we show which are the consequences of this observation, and how can be used to provide a
quantification of emergence compatible with the scientific method.
5.2 Coverage excess
It is difficult to investigate the effects that an increase on system’s size may have on traceability, because it
would mean that we already have a full knowledge of the underlying constraints and how they would extend
through the new elements, which is not typically the case when investigating complex systems. An alternative
would be to intervene in the system neglecting components of the model and then monitor which is the relative
change in our ability to predict the system’s behaviour after the intervention. This strategy has been highlighted
as a basic ingredient to link computational modelling with the scientific method [37]. When we neglect any
component, we will reduce our predictive power if we lose constraints and, thus, there will be more states of
the system compatible with the remaining constraints. We can quantify which is the uncertainty we generate
when we lose constraints, what means that we can relate the causal effects that a component has on the other
components, according to the notion of Granger causality [18].
We illustrate the proposal in Fig. 5 considering the three-bits synthetic examples again. Starting from any
of the systems, we neglect the components one by one, and we explore which are the two-bit states recovered.
Depending on whether any constraint was lost or not, we are able to build from these states a number of
three-bit states. We simply introduce back into the system the variable neglected allowing it to get any viable
value. Exploring systematically all the variables we infer which is the influence of the underlying constraints.
For instance, for S1, if we neglect the first component x1 –where the constraint relies–, we obtain all possible
states of a two-bits system containing components x2 and x3. This is because the unique constraint in the
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Figure 5: Scheme illustrating the definition of coverage excess. The scheme is divided in five columns (1-5)
that we describe from left to right. (1) The three-bits systems under analysis in the main text are shown. If we
intervene in the systems neglecting one component (2) we will obtain a set of 2-bits states (3). For the system
S1, removing x1 lead to different states than if x2 or x3 are removed, while S2 and S3 lead to the same states
independently of the component removed (see Main Text for details). From the two-bits states, we recover
the neglected component keeping it free of any constraint, which leads to a number of compatible 3-bits states
(4). In the last column we show the result for the coverage excess obtained from this procedure using Eq. 8.
The final value for the coverage excess of the system will be the average among the values obtained from the
different interventions.
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system was deleted, and thus we can recover the whole phase space Ω when we build up all the three-bit states
compatible with these two-bit states. On the other hand, if we neglect any of the other two components x2
or x3, the constraint still remains in the first component x1. Therefore, if we look into the three-bit states
compatible with the two-bit states we are constrained for coming back to the original system S1. For the system
S2, irrespective of the component neglected we reach the same two bits states. From them, we obtain not only
the original three bits states but two more, what means that we have lost one constraint every time, but the
other one is still active. For S3, irrespective of the component neglected, we obtain all possible two bits states,
and hence the whole phase space will be always recovered, hence the constraint is always completely lost.
With this kind of interventions we can quantify how the original system is covered in excess when any
intervention takes place. More formally, let’s call U to the subset of concepts contained in the focus F describing
a set of microstates S = {µ} containing N components in the phase space Ω, which we know is associated to a
novel macroscopic property. Then remove any of the xi components and consider a new set of microstates S
′
of a system with N − 1 components. Next call V (xi) to the subset of concepts describing the set of microstates
S′′ of a system with N components obtained by adding a new unconstrained component x′i to S
′. We say that
the coverage excess Ξ of S induced after neglecting the variable xi and introducing the component x
′
i is the
quantity
Ξ(xi) =
#(Ext(V (xi))) −#(Ext(U))
#(Ext(F ))−#(Ext(U))
=
#(S′′)−#(S)
#(Ω)−#(S)
(8)
where the function #(·) returns the number of microstates contained in the set. This quantity takes a value
of zero, when the states recovered are the same than the original ones, and it takes one when it is recovered
the whole phase space. To consider a single value for the coverage excess we will average the result of the
intervention over all variables:
〈Ξ〉 =
1
N
∑
i
Ξ(xi) (9)
If the system is very large an exhaustive computation may be unfeasible, and a random sampling of the
different components or more complex interventions such as the removal of several variables, and we indicate
this averaging over interventions with the brackets 〈·〉. For the examples explored in the three bits system, we
obtain 〈Ξ〉S1 = 1/3, 〈Ξ〉S2 = 1/2 and 〈Ξ〉S3 = 1. The coverage excess reflects the vulnerability of the system to
this intervention and, as the effects have to do with the number of variables over which we intervene and with
the scope of the constraints present in the system, it provides a mechanism to differentiate between upward
and downward causation [38]. The system S1 is very vulnerable if x1 is neglected but it is not affected at
all if any other variable is neglected, and thus there is upward causation from the first variable to the whole
system. On the other hand, the system S3 is very vulnerable, as the coverage excess is maximum irrespective
of the variable over which we intervene, thus highlighting that there is a global constraint affecting the system
downwards . Note as well that these values will scale differently with system size. While for S1 〈Ξ〉S1 → 0
when N → ∞, for S3 it will remain constant and equal to one. Finally, we consider the particular case in
which we are already dealing with a subset of microscopic concepts U such that an emergent process described
by the macroscopic concept cˆ is perfectly covered, i.e. such that Ext(U) = Ext(cˆ). In this case, we will say
that the Eq. 9 provides the coverage excess of the emergent property cˆ, that we denote as
〈
Ξˆ
〉
.
5.3 Loss of traceability and emergence strength
The sensitivity of the knowledge of the observer when it intervenes on the system suggests that, in the research
process, systems with higher coverage excess will be more difficult to analyse. This difficulty can be combined
with the notion of traceability we proposed above. If we have a perfectly traceable system, we can quantify
how much we lose traceability after intervention with the loss of traceability
Υ = 1−
〈
Ξˆ
〉
. (10)
With this quantity we express that those systems which are easily covered in excess have a low traceability,
and the other way around. Therefore, the associated macroscopic property will be difficult to explain, from
which the following definition for the emergence strength σ of the emergent property arises naturally
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σ = −log(Υ). (11)
We took the natural logarithm of the traceability to represent the emergence strength as a distance between
an state of perfect knowledge of the system (complete traceability) and the state after intervention. If, after
intervention, we still remain in a situation of perfect traceability, this distance will be zero. On the other hand,
if we completely lose all the information about the system in a way that, with the above procedure, we recover
an unconstrained phase space, this distance will be infinity, thus reflecting some epistemological gap for these
systems.
With these definitions we expect to reconcile different positions on whether the origin of emergence is epis-
temological or ontological: even if we deal with a perfectly traceable system –thus epistemologically accessible–,
we can still see that there are systems that are particularly more inaccessible than others, and there are on-
tological reasons for that, namely the type of constraints involved in the system. For these systems, until
perfect traceability is attained, we will probably be tempted to say that they are epistemological inaccessible,
and that there is an strictly ontological and not epistemological reason for that. But it is a combination of
both, there is an ontological reason why their emergence strength is so high as to build an epistemologically
accessible (microscopic) description, but it does not mean that such description cannot be achieved at some
point. We propose to solve controversies around the definition of weak and strong emergent properties [15]
using the emergent strength: if the emergence strength is infinite we deal with a strongly emergent pattern
whereas if the value is finite we deal with a weak emergent pattern with the associated strength as an indicator
of how difficult it is to trace it.
Of course, we cannot discard that there exist systems epistemologically inaccessible. This may be the case
for quantum, relativistic or computational systems –some of which the definitions of weak and strong emergence
where originally thought–, but not for many systems of scientific interest (such as living systems) where we
believe that the situation is rather the one that we expose here: these systems are very large and they are
under constraints with a large scope. Note that it may be argued that, with the above definitions, it cannot
be determined the emergence strength unless we achieved perfect traceability. This is only true for strong
emergent properties because Eq. 10 can be easily modified to consider an intermediate state of knowledge,
just using the expression in Eq. 9 (and not
〈
Ξˆ
〉
), which will give us an estimation of the emergence strength.
We expect indeed that for natural systems there is a complex structure of constraints with different scopes,
and we will be able to progressively discover this structure –possibly from low to high scopes–, and provide an
estimation at any time.
6 Discussion
In this article we proposed a novel approach to investigate the concept of emergence in complex systems. We
tackled the problem through the formalism of concrete topology, which is a constructive logical system that
permits the investigation of the relationship between concepts and objects of observation [39]. In doing so, we
focused in a particular kind of systems, which we believe attain much interest in the nowadays discussion of
emergence. First, we considered that we are analysing a naturally occurring macroscopic emergent property,
and not a process generated from a computation. In addition, we neglect any vitalism, what means nothing but
accepting explanatory physicalism –using the words of Mitchell, what else could be?[2]–. To continue with, we
considered that we are able to describe microstates of the system through experimental measurements. This
implicitly assumes that we are able to differentiate the system from its background [23] and that we are able to
provide a bottom-up characterization in terms of concepts associated to the elements that constitute the system
[16]. Nevertheless, we considered as well that we have no clue on which mechanistic processes underlie these
observations, as it happens when research on a new process is starting. When the underlying mechanism is
well understood, there are already interesting proposals in the literature providing measures of emergence [40],
but obviously this is not the case for most of the natural processes under research. Finally, we highlighted that
there exist a relationship between the macroscopic observation of the emergent property and the constrained
walk of the system in certain region of the phase space. With these conditions in mind, we aimed to talk about
systems from which we expect to find sufficient regularities in the analysis of microstates as to be able to build
explanatory models, i.e. in potentially robust emergent systems, which are the focus of the scientific interest
[14].
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Equipped with these tools and with a minimal description of complex system we showed that, when two
descriptions coexist, the less detailed description is prone to generate dialectical concepts, that are vague
unless a more explanatory description removes the ambiguity. This is the case between the macroscopic and
microscopic description when an emergent property is observed, as it is typically not immediate to explain the
emergent phenomena from the microscopic description. We showed that, building a microscopic model aimed
to remove the ambiguity of the macroscopic observation, requires to identify constraints in the viable values of
the microscopic variables. Interestingly, we identified concept disjunction as the basic logic operation to find
constraints. Since long it has been recognized the importance of comparisons for the proper determination of
any object, that may be viewed as a negative determination through the exploration of the limits of the object,
as it was stated by Hegel [41]:
“the object, like any determinate being in general, has the determinateness of its totality outside
it in other objects, and these in turn have theirs outside them, and so on to infinity. The return–
into–self of this progression to infinity must indeed likewise be assumed and represented as a totality,
a world; but that world is nothing but the universality that is confined within itself by indeterminate
individuality, that is, a universe.”
With disjunction we explore the progression of an elementary object into other objects that may eventually
lead to the identification of new objects exceeding the individuality of the starting objects, and then back: the
identification of objects with a larger scope reinforce the individuality of the elementary objects. The search of
similarity measures, dissimilarity measures or distances is an essential task in Biology and Ecology [42] aiming to
understand, following a top-down approach, the information shared between the different observations. This is
probably why methods comparing objects of observation, such as protein sequence alignments like BLAST [43],
are the most cited ever in the scientific literature [44]. In general, disjunction is on the basis of dimensionality
reduction techniques such as principal components analysis [45]. Following our framework, these are techniques
aiming to obtain a representation with the minimum number of concepts explaining the maximum variability
in the space of objects. In this way, we are able to talk about the set of objects using a subset of concepts,
which is essentially the task addressed by dimensionality reduction techniques, and that we defined here with
the notion of compact description.
We then applied these tools to three different ensembles of microstates of a three-bits synthetic system. We
observed that the scope of the constraints is the main difficulty to identify them: larger is the scope of the
constraint more difficult is to assess it. In particular, our method was unable to find a compact representation
when the scope of the constraint has the same size than the system, which directly links the epistemological
limitation of our framework with an ontological property of the system. We briefly visited other approximations,
identifying that the type of constraints heavily influence the consequences that either an increase in system size
or a loss of components may have in our ability to identify them. This observation seems to be independent of
the formalism followed, and thus of any subjectivity induced by the one we chose here.
Notably, we were able to express this observation with concrete topology. We proposed a procedure based
on the intervention of the observer on the system, thus compatible with the scientific method, to compute
the loss of information experienced when we neglect components in the system. As this loss of information
depends on the type of constraints present, we can quantify how difficult is to achieve traceability between the
microscopic and macroscopic description. The loss of traceability was then used as a quantity to establish a
distance between perfect traceability and our knowledge of the system after intervention, what we called the
emergence strength.
We believe that, for the kind of systems we are analysing, the emergence strength paves the way to reconcile
the differences between the notion of weak and strong emergence. In the systems we are interested, we aim
to develop computational models to reproduce the experimentally measured data and simulate the emergent
process, and thus it is compatible with weak emergence. Nevertheless, we propose to move the focus from
the ability of building a computational model to simulate the process to an earlier scientific stage, namely
the identification of constraints from experimental data. In the identification of constraints is where we start
learning about the nature of the natural process we face. In this way, we focus in understanding the number
and scope of the constraints, whose complexity will determine its emergence strength.
We conjecture that for systems with different types of constraints, those with smaller scope are identified
first. Accordingly, if a system has only constraints with a large scope or there is a big gap with respect to those
with lower scope, it may be simply impossible at a certain stage of knowledge to assess them, an example of
this may be our nowadays knowledge of consciousness. For these processes, the emergence strength may be
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so large that it would be justified to call them strongly emergent processes. This definition seems compatible
as well with the classification proposed by de Haan [8], as the existence of a microscopic emergent conjugated
causally affecting the macroscopic pattern (in the strongest case, consciously), can be understood in terms of a
global constraint (as he recognises relating this type of emergence with downward causation). This is the case
in living systems where we believe strong emergence may be pervasive.
Natural selection can be viewed as a global constraint acting in very large temporal scales for every individual
organisms. The constraints that one individual feels will have certain similarities with those felt by another
individual (e.g. periodic exposition to day-light) being others specific to the individual’s micro-environment.
The term closure has been coined to described the fact that organisms and the environment (which includes
other organisms) are entangled through interactions exerting a mutual influence such that natural selection is
modulated by the activity of the organisms themselves [46]. This picture, in its stronger version (in which the
influence is so high that the notion of individual as object of selection is challenged), becomes more and more
important in nowadays research, overall in microbial world (see for instance [47]).
Consider the following example proposed in [48], in which we consider one individual for which its fitness
fi can be decomposed in two components, where the first component reflects the fitness f
int
ij of the individual
as a consequence of its ecological interactions with other species j, and the second its fitness f inti due to any
other process, thus fi = f
int
ij +f
int
i . Now consider a particular example, in which two individuals belong to two
different species, a and b, interacting mutualistically. Finally, think in an evolutionary event which becomes
fixed in the population of species a affecting its fitness, fa → fˆa, in such a way that the new fitness fˆa < fa
and, in particular, fˆ inta = f
int
a but fˆ
int
ab < f
int
ab . This means that the fitness of species b due to the interaction
with species a will be also affected after the evolutionary event and, thus, there will be a change in the
selection pressure of the regions of the genomes of both species codifying the traits needed for the interaction.
Furthermore, if we consider an extreme scenario in which f intab ≫ f
int
a and f
int
ba ≫ f
int
b –that may be the case
for auxotrophs (see a synthetic ecological experiment in [49])–, the importance of these coevolving regions in
the evolutionary process would be so high, that the conception of object of selection should be revisited [50]:
it might be more appropriate to frame the evolution of both species considering them as a particular kind of
multicellular species. This is probably why it has been emphasized the importance of mutualistic interactions
in emergent processes [3], although recent theoretical results suggests that mutualism is not necessary to derive
a mathematically precise definition of community-level fitness [51].
Not surprisingly, there is increasing interest in the development of methods for the inference of interactions,
but the essence of the question remains the same. If we aim to understand emergent processes through
interaction patterns, we will compare microstates representated through networks of interactions, and the
main evolutionary constraints will be identified finding their common topological properties [48].
In summary, we find that the formalism we used here improves our ability to synthetically understand
complex problems. We believe it could be used as well to face other challenging questions such as the concept
of closure, and thus we hope that our effort will stimulate both the scientific and philosophical community.
Looking for fresh formal approaches to talk about philosophical questions is particularly important because,
just as formal frameworks help us in making predictions, they will help us as well in shaping the philosophical
knowledge and to establish new links between science and philosophy. This would be probably good news for
science, as the benefits of philosophy seem to be, for nowadays scientists, left behind.
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Appendix
In this appendix we provide the pseudocode to generateM strings of size N containing the constraints described
in systems S1, S2 and S3 in the Main Text. An implementation in Fortran is available in Supplementary
Material. The scripts have been developed trying to keep similar most of the structure for the three systems,
which can be summarized as follows:
%Variables declaration
type x(N) % describes every bit in the system x={0,1}
for i in 1 to M
for j in 1 to N
if constraint
x(j)=applyConstraint()
else
x(j)=rndGenerator()
endif
write x(j)
endfor
endfor
Where the function applyConstraint applies the constraint correspondent to the condition constraint, which
depends on the system, and the function rndGenerator randomly generates a zero or a one. For each system,
the constraints are applied as follows:
% S1 constraint:
if(j==1)
x(j)=1
endif
_________________________
% S2 constraint:
if((x(j-2)==1)or(x(j-1)==1))
x(j)=1
endif
_________________________
% S3 constraint:
if(j==N)
Remainder=MOD(Total,2)
if(Remainder==0)THEN
x(j)=1
else
x(j)=0
endif
endif
where Total is a variable that sums-up all the N − 1 previous values and MOD is a function that returns the
remainder of a module two division of Total. Note that, while S1 and S3 have a straightforward generalization
of their constraints from a 3-bits system to a N-bits system, it is not the case for S2 where several generalizations
are possible. We decided to extend the system adding bits from left to right and keeping the original constraints
along the chain. This will generate a bias in the distribution of the output microstates, rapidly decreasing the
probability of generating strings containing many zeros for increasing N .
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Next, the scripts have been compiled with gfortran (gcc versión 4.8.5 in Red Hat 4.8.5-4) and the binaries
compressed with both bzip2 (version 1.0.6) and gzip (version 1.5), obtaining qualitatively similar results. It
is important to remark that the scripts should be coded with as few dissimilarities as possible. For instance,
S2 and S3 require two additional variables respect to S1, which already make a difference in the compression
ratios. But, if for whatever reason, we decide to use for these two variables integer types for S2 and real types
for S3 (or the other way around) the results may be qualitatively different. This is one of the reasons why the
complexity of the system is difficult to assess with this kind of approximation. Although our implementation
is close to be optimal, as the size of the binaries before compression is almost the same (13467Kb for S1 and
S2 and 13519Kb for S3) we find that concrete topology provides a fairer framework for comparing different
systems.
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